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THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INSURER'S IMMUNITY
This Comment will be concerned mainly with three standard
features of workmen's compensation systems throughout the
United States. The first of these features is that the employer is
immune from any common law suit brought by his employee as a
result of injuries received incident to employment.' This immunity from common law suit is the consideration that the employer
receives for guaranteeing the injured employee a limited monetary
recovery for his injuries not based on fault and for giving up his
common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of
the risk, and the fellow servant rule. Another feature commonly
found in workmen's compensation acts is that the employer is required to secure his liability to an injured employee through pri2
vate insurance coverage, state fund insurance, or self-insurance.
Thus, the burden of compensation liability does not remain on the
shoulders of the employer but passes to the consumer of his products, since compensation insurance premiums will in all likelihood
be reflected in the price of the product. Under most of the workmen's compensation acts the employee retains the right to sue a
third party tortfeasor who actually causes his injury. This Cor1. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481 (1952):
Such an agreement shall constitute an acceptance of all the provisions of article three of this act, and shall operate as a surrender
by the parties thereto of their rights to any form or amount of compensation or damages for any injury or death occurring in the
course of the employment, or to any method of determination,
thereof, other than as provided in article three of this act....
For similar provisions of other states, see SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPiNsATION STATUTES (1939, Supp. 1969).
2. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (1952):
Every employer liable under this act to pay compensation shall insure the payment of compensation in the State Workmen's Insurance Fund, or in any insurance company, or mutual association or
company, authorized to insure such liability in this Commonwealth, unless such employer shall be exempted by the department
from such insurance.
For similar provisions of other states, see SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION STATUT
(1939, Supp. 1969).
3. See, e.g., IOWA CODE tit. 6, § 85.22 (1949):
When an employee receives an injury for which compensation is
payable . . . and which injury is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against some person other than the employer
to pay damages, the employee ... may take proceedings against
his employer for compensation, and . . . may also maintain an action against such third-party for damages. ...
For similar provisions of other states, see ScHNzIDE, WoauavaEN's COMP$NaATTON STATUTES (1939, Supp. 1969).

ment will consider the question of whether the workmen's compensation insurer should be granted an immunity from suit similAr,
to that of the actual employer or be placed in the class of possible
third party tortfeasor when it performs safety inspections or proRecent judicial and
vides health clinics and similar services..
legislative decisions on this, question will be examined and evaluated in the light of the purpose of workmen's compensation as
well as the practical economic and legal considerations involved.
BACKGROUND

The textwriters agree that the necessity for workmen's compensation legislation arose out of the coincidence of a sharp increase in industrial accidents attending the rise of the factory system and a simultaneous decrease in the employee's common :law.
dating
remedies for his injuries. In both the Laws of Henry 'I,:
from about the year 1100, and early Germanic law, liability for an
employee's injuries resulting from service to the employer-was
placed upon the employer. 6 In 1837, in the case of Priestly v.
Fowler,7 the fellow servant exception to the general rule of
master's vicarious liability was established. The effect of this
exception was exploded upon the working man when the courts of
fast industrializing America began following this decision to encourage industrial enterprise by making the burdens on industry
as light as possible." The assumption of the risk doctrine soon
followed and became a well established defense by the middle of
the nineteenth century.9 Shortly thereafter, contributory negligence became the third employer defense to defeat an employee's
action. Even when direct negligence of the employer could be
shown, recovery was denied if negligence, 'even the smallest
1
Thus, by
amount, on the part of the employee could be shown. O
the end of the nineteenth century, increasing industrial injuries
and decreasing remedies had produced in the United States a situation ripe for radical change," a change which had already occurred
4. For an excellent discussion of the liability of third parties other
than the workmen's compensation insurer under workmen's compensation
acts, see A. McCosn, The Third Person in the Compensation-Picture, 37
Tx. L. REv. 389 (1959).
5.

S. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

LAws 6 (1944) (hereinafter cited as HoRovrrz); 1 A. LARSON, LARSON'S
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 23 (1968) (hereinafter cited as LARsON);

W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 554 (3d. 1964) (hereinafter cited as Paossrat)."
6.

HOROVITz 5; LARSON 23-24.

9.

LARSON 28.

7. 3 M. &W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837).
8. Farwell v. Boston & W. R.R., 4 Mete. 49 (Mass. 1849).

"

10. Schemmer v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry., 220 U.S. 590 (1911); Meunier v.
I
i
Chemical Paper Co., 180 Mass. 109, 61 N.E. 810 (1901).
11. Thus, under the common law system which incorporated the
above three defenses, the great majority of industrial accidents remaini
uncompensated. This majority has been variously -estimated-by -different:
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12
in Germany, another industrial nation.

In 1893 John Graham Books wrote a book on the German system of compensation which was published as the Fourth Special
Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor. Legislators
throughout the country looked upon this report as a possible means
to remedy the intolerable situation of the industrial employee. Another stimulus to state action was provided by the first British
Compensation Act of 1897. These two systems became the model
of many state acts.13 Although these newly adopted workmen's
compensation acts were subject to preliminary objections of being
unconstitutional, 14 in 1917 the Supreme Court held workmen's compensation acts to be within the police power of the state their pur-5
pose being to protect the health and welfare of the workmen.
Today, all fifty states have some type of Workmen's Compensation Act.'8 Four basic principles lie at the heart of these workmen
compensation laws: (1) An employee is automatically entitled to
certain benefits whenever he suffers a "personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment";' 7 (2) The benefits
to the employee under the acts include cash wage benefits, usually
between 1/2 to 2/3 of his average weekly wage, and hospital and
medical expenses and in death cases, benefits for dependents are
provided at arbitrary maximum and minimum limits;' s (3) The employee and his dependents, in exchange for the above assured benefits, give up their common law right to sue the employer for any inauthorities. 1 SCmNEER, WOPRKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1 (2d ed. 1932) (70%);
DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK ACCIDENT INDEMxNITY IN IOWA 71 (1912) (83%);

1 FIRST REPORT OF NEW YORK EMPLOYERS' LIAmrrY COMM. 25 (1910) (87%).

12. In 1838 Prussia enacted a law making railroads liable to their employees (as well as passengers) for accidents from all causes except an act
of God or the negligence of the plaintiff. In 1857, Prussia required employers in certain industries to contribute one-half to the sickness funds
formed under various local statutes. Then in 1884 Germany adopted the
first modern compensation system. See LARSON 34.
13. The individual states created commissions to investigate these
systems of compensation and file recommendations with the legislatures.
See LARSON 37.

14.

Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).

15. Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (an exclusive
state fund type of workmen's compensation act was held constitutional);

Hawkins v. Blankly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (an elective type of workmen's
compensation act was held constitutional); New York Cent. BR. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917) (a compulsory type workmen's compensation act was
held constitutional).
16.

PROSSER 554.

17. For a full discussion of the interpretation of these words see
HoRovTz 72-182 and 1 LARSON 193-622.178.
18.

1 LARSON 1.

jury covered by the act; 19 (4) The administration of workmen's
compensation acts is typically in the hands of administrative commissions and, as far as possible, rules of procedure and evidence
are relaxed to facilitiate the achievement of the beneficient pur20
poses of the legislation.
STATR or THE LAW

The overwhelming majority of federal courts of appeals and
district courts which have considered the immunity of the workmen's compensation insurer in interpreting various state acts have
held that the insurer is immune from a common law suit brought
by the injured employee or his personal representative. 21 The only
court of appeals case that has held that the workmen's compensation employer is not immune from suit is Mays v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.

22

California, Massachusetts, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin all have decisions from their appellate courts holding
that the workmen's compensation insurer is immune from common law suit under their respective state acts. 23 In contrast, the
highest courts of Michigan and New Jersey hold that the insurer
can be sued at common law for its negligence even though the injury occurred during the course of employment. 24

19.

The Illinois Su-

1 LARSON 2.
20. 1 LARSON 2.
21. Mustapha v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 387 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1967),
aff'g, 268 F. Supp. 890 (D.R.I. 1967) (negligence suit for improper safety
inspection under the Rhode Island Workmen's Compensation Act); Kotanski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967), aJJ'g, 244 F. Supp.
547 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (negligence suit for improper safety inspection under the Michigan Workmen's Compensation Act); Donohue v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 363 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1966), aff'g, 248 F. Supp. 588 (D.C. Md.
1965) (negligence suit for improper medical care under the Maryland
Workmen's Compensation Act); Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co., 358 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1966) (negligence suit for improper safety inspection under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act); Sarber v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 23 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1928) (negligence suit for improper safety inspection under the California Workmen's Compensation
Act); Bartolotta v. United States Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 276 F. Supp. 66
(D. Conn. 1967); Hill v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 272 F. Supp.
569 (M.D. Fla. 1967); Home v. Security Mut. Cas. Co., 265 F. Supp. 379
(E.D. Ark. 1967); West v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 264 F. Supp.
697 (E.D. Mo. 1966); Gerace v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 95
(D.D.C. 1966); Schultz v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 411
(E.D. Wash. 1954).
22. 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963).
23. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d
416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 891 (3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Flood v. Merchants Mut.
Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 (1963); Matthews v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968); Hughes v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 229 Mo. App. 472, 76 S.W.2d 101 (1937); Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
434 Pa. 507, 254 A.2d 27 (1969); Kemer v. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 35 Wis. 2d 391, 151 N.W.2d 72 (1967).
24. Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 55, 1.58 N.W.2d 786
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preme Court in interpreting Florida's workmen's compensation act
25
held that the insurer was not immune from common law suit,
but the federal district court for the middle district of Florida
refused to follow this decision in interpreting the Florida act. 26
The Iowa and New Hampshire supreme courts also decided that
the insurer was not immune,27 but the legislatures of these states
amended their workmen's compensation acts and expressly granted
the insurer immunity for injuries occurring during the course of
employment.281 In addition to Iowa and New Hampshire, Indiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Wisconsin all have specific legislation granting the insurer
immunity from common law suit for injuries received during the
course of employment. 9
Most state constitutions, as well as the federal constitution, 0
contain a provision similar to Article 1, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which reads: "All courts shall be open; and
every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay." Also most
states have provided for the legislative adoption of workmen's compensation acts by amending their respective constitutions with a
provision similar to Pennsylvania's article 3, section 18 which reads:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the
payment by employers, or employers and employees
jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employees arising in the course of their employment, and for
occupational diseases of employees, whether or not such
injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault
of employer or employee, and fixing the basis of ascertain(1968)

(negligence suit for improper safety inspection); Mager v. United

Hospitals, 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d 664 (1965),

aff'd per curiam, 46

N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966) (negligence suit for improper medical care).
25.
(1964).
26.

Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 II. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769
Hill v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 272 F. Supp. 569 (M.D. Fla.

1967) (Florida Workmen's Compensation Act).

27. Fabricus v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d
361 (1963); Smith v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564
(1960).
28. IOWA CODE tit. 6 § 88 A.14 (1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
2-B § 281:1 (1956).
29. IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 8, § 40-1205 (1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 699805, 6998-36 (1942); NEB. REv. STAT. tit. 3A, § 48-111 (1968); N.M. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 59-10-4(F) (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 656.018(3) (1965);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 501 (Supp. 1969); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. tit. 22,

art. 8306, § 3 (1967); WiS. STAT. tit. 16, § 102.03(2) (Supp. 1969).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

ment of such compensation and the maximum and minimum limits thereof, and providing special or general remedies for the collection thereof; but in no other case shall
the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered
for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons
or property....
In those states where there is an expressed grant of immunity
in the act itself3 ' or where the courts have interpreted the act to
grant immunity to the workmen's compensation carrier,3 2 the legislatures have used this constitutional power (to provide special remedies for the collection of compensation for injuries arising in
the course of employment) to grant the workmen's compensation
insurer immunity from common law action for injuries to an employee arising during the course of employment. This power to
deprive a person of a common law remedy is vested in the legislature under its police power upon declared public policy of the
33
state where circumstances and conditions warrant such action.
Thus, the legislature granting immunity relies on its power to enact workmen's compensation laws and its police power by reasoning that there are circumstances and conditions of public policy
which make it appropriate to deprive an individual of his constitutionally guaranteed right to sue another person in a court of
law. It is not the purpose of this Comment to analyze the reasoning of the individual cases or to consider the constitutionality of
the grant of immunity but to present and evaluate the policy arguments considered by the courts in order to evaluate the issue of
the workmen's compensation insurer's immunity.
II.

THE INSURER'S RIGHT OF SUBROGATION

One argument that has been considered in most workmen's
compensation cases on the subject of insurer's immunity is that
by disallowing immunity to the workmen compensation insurer the
court would be depriving the insurer of its subrogation right because the insurer would have to sue itself. 4 Under basic insurance principles, the insurer has the right to proceed directly against
a third-party tortfeasor as subrogee to the rights of the injured
party. 5 Thus, assuming that the insurer is liable and that im31. See statutes cited in notes 27 and 28 supra.
32. See cases cited in note 22 supra.
33. Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
rev'd, 323 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1963); Fabricus v. Montgomery Elevator
Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1963).
34. Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.2d 799, 802
(4th Cir. 1966); Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547, 557
(E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967).
35. This basic insurance principal is carried over into the workmen's
compensation statutes. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671:
...where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by
the act or omission of a third party the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employee, his personal representative, his
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munity is disallowed, the insurer would have only the right to
sue itself as the third-party tortfeasor. Some courts, however,
have suggested a seemingly simple answer to this rather incongruous result by using a setoff procedure.3 6 The amount of setoff in
favor of the insurer would be the amount of money the insurer
had already paid the plaintiff under the plaintiff's workmen compensation coverage against the amount of the judgment received
at common law. Thus, the defendant insurer would be subrogated
to the rights of its insured plaintiff for the amount of workmen's compensation paid to the insured by the insurer. Therefore, the common situation in which the injured employee takes
his award under workmen's compensation and later sues the insurer for its negligent inspection or negligent operation of a clinic
presents few problems as far as double recovery or lack of subrogation rights are concerned.
III.

INSURER IS EQUATED WITH EMPLOYER

Explicit in most cases considering the insurer's immunity is the
argument that an insurer is simply taking the place of the employer when it is performing its functions as safety inspector and
clinic operator and therefore should be granted the same immunity as the employer.3 7 Typical of the contentions in favor of
this view is the opinion of the district court in Mays v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.!" The Mays court points out that an employer conducting negligent safety inspections which cause injury
to an employee would be liable only under the workmen's compensation act and further that this liability will then become that
estate or his dependents, against such third party to the extent of
the compensation payable under this article by the employer....
36. Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1963);
Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 55, 158 N.W.2d 786, 784
(1968); Mager v. United Hospitals, 88 N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d 664, 668
(App. Div. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 46 N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966).
37. Gerace v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1966);
Mays v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 211 F. Supp. 541, 544 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
rev'd, 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1963); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.
2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769, 791 (1964); Fabricus v. Montgomery Elevator Co.,
254 Iowa 1319, 121 N.W.2d 361, 365 (1963); Smith v. American Emp. Ins.
Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564, 567 (1960); Mager v. United Hospitals, 88
N.J. Super. 421, 212 A.2d 664, 667 (App. Div. 1965), afj'd per curiam, 46
N.J. 398, 217 A.2d 325 (1966); Adcox v. Pennsylvania Mfr's. Ass'n. Cas.
Ins. Co., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 179, 196 (C.P. No. 6 Phila. 1964); Brown v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 37 Pa. D. & C. 111, 124, 128 (C.P. No. 2 Phila. 1964),
aff'd, 434 Pa. 507, 254 A.2d 27 (1969).
38. 211 F. Supp. 541, 544 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 323 F.2d 174 (3d Cir.

1963).

of the carrier. The next premise of the argument is that because
the employer has a duty to inspect or bear the consequences, the
insurance company acting within its function as the insurance
carrier is only assisting the employer in making these safety inspections and providing clinics. An argument of similar tenor is
found in State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Superior Court39
where the court notes that, since "the process of insuring" is made
an integral part of the workmen's compensation system, when the
insurer inspects or provides medical care it is performing a service which is interwoven directly with its status as insurer and
which it with its greater resources can better perform than can
most employers.
The court granting immunity concede that the insurer is not
acting altruistically when it provides safety inspections and health
clinics or similar services. 40 The cost of these services will be
reflected in the premium charge and these services, by lessening
the chance of injury and lowering the cost of medical treatment,
are actually reducing the amount of compensation payments the
insurer will have to make and thereby increasing the insurer's
profits. Thus, the insurer's services do in fact protect the employees from injury, but they also provide the insurer with most
substantial benefit.
The real fallacy of the argument that the insurer is acting in
the shoes of the employer becomes apparent when the insurance
contract between the employer and the insurance company is examined. Under the contract, the insurer's sole liability to the injured
employee occurs when the employee is injured in an accident
occurring in the course of employment and whereby the employer
becomes liable. The "process of insuring" is made an integral part
of the workmen's compensation system but only as a means to make
certain that an employer will have the means to pay the injured
employee under the schedule of payments fixed in the act. When
an injured employee sues the workmen's compensation carrier, he
is not seeking recovery for negligence pursuant to the insurance
company's obligation to pay the compensation payments to the injured employee under the act but rather, he is seeking recovery
for a negligent act foreign from the insurance company's liability
under the act.4" When the carrier performs safety inspections or
provides health clinics, it is not fulfilling a reasponsibility under
the act and is not acting under the control of the employer. Rather,
39. 237 Cal. App. 2d 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 891, 894 (3rd Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
40. Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 Pa. 507, 515, 254 A.2d 27, 30 (1969).
41. It is established that if an employer should contract with an independent safety engineer to perform safety inspections, the safety engineer would be amenable to suit for any alleged negligence which caused
injury to an employee. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court,
237 Cal. App. 2d 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 891, 896 (3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
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it is acting under its own initiative by suggesting changes that will
help its own interest. Therefore, the insurance company's status
in providing these services is more analogous to an independent
contractor than a servant of the employer and thus is not a proper
basis upon which to base the grant of immunity.
IV. POLICY DECIsIoN-THE

PRACTICAL EFFECTS
OF No IMMUNITY

The courts, and I must assume the state legislatures which
have granted immunity to the workmen's compensation carrier,
reason that if no immunity were granted, the carriers would raise
their rates and or discontinue safety inspections and emergency
clinics and thus the ultimate losers would be the injured workmen
whose injuries could have been prevented or lessened by the
carrier's actions. 42 The first fallacy in this reasoning is that just because the insurer may not make safety inspections or provide
emergency clinics does not mean that these services will not be
rendered. The employer himself may provide these services or
the employer may hire someone to provide them. The employer's
incentive for doing this would be to lower or maintain his insurance premium rates at the same level. The employer may also
be forced into providing these services in negotiations with his
labor union. Another assumption of the above reasoning is that
the insurer will abandon these money saving procedures rather
than raise his premium rates. If the insurance company does
continue its safety inspections and emergency clinics and judgments are entered against them in civil actions, the company
will just raise its premium rates in order to continue at the same
profit ratio. The increase in premium rates will in turn be passed
on to the consumer of the product made by the employer and in
actuality to every consumer. Thus, the loss will be carried
by the broad base of society. This is the solution most commonly
suggested to other tort problems of a similar nature 8 Thus, the
probable effect of no immunity for the insurer would be to place
42. Mustaph v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D.R.I.),
aff'd, 387 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1967); Hotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244
F. Supp. 547, 588 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd, 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967);

State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 416, 46
Cal. Rptr. 891, 896 (3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Matthews v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348, 350 (1968); Brown v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 434 Pa. 507, 514, 254 A.2d 27, 29 (1969); Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
37 Pa. D. & C.2d 111, 126, 129 (C.P. No. 2 Phila. 1964), afd, 434 Pa. 507,
254 A.2d 27 (1969).
43. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs, § 13.2 (1956).

the cost of the individual's injuries upon the broadest possible
base.
V.

PURPOSE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS AND THE
ANOMALY OF IMMUNITY

Workmen's compensation acts provide compensation in accordance with a definite schedule based upon the loss or impairment
of the workmen's wage earning power. 44 The injured employee
gives up his common law right to sue his employer for his injuries
in consideration for the right to the above compensation based
on the fact that he was injured incident to employment. Courts
across the United States have given various purposes for workmen's compensation acts. 45 but as shown in the background ma44. The schedules of compensation are usually broken down into
three categories-schedule for total disability, partial disability, and disability from permanent injuries of certain classes. Examples of this kind
of compensation are found in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 511-513 (1952).
These sections will be summarized below to inform the reader of the
amounts of compensation that a particular injured employee will receive
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 511 (1952) provides:
For total disability, sixty-six and two-thirds per centiem of the
wages of the injured employee ... beginning after the seventh day
of total disability, but the compensation shall not be more than
sixty dollars per week nor less than thirty-five dollars per week.
... (Emphasis added).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512 (1952) provides:
For disability partial in character sixty-six and two-thirds per
centum of the difference between the wages of the injured employee . . . and the earning power of the employee thereafter; but
such compensation shall not be more than forty-five dollars per
week. This compensation shall be paid during the period of such
partial disability . . . but for not more than three hundred and
fifty weeks.... (Emphasis added).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 513 (1952) provides:
For all disability resulting from permanent injuries of the following classes, the compensation shall be exclusively as follows:
(1)
loss of a hand, 66%% of wages during 175 weeks
(2) loss of a forearm, 66%% of wages during 195 weeks
(3) loss of an arm, 66%% of wages during 215 weeks
(4) loss of a foot, 66% % of wages during 150 weeks
(5)
loss of a lower leg, 66%% of wages during 180 weeks
(6) loss of a leg, 66% % of wages during 215 weeks
(7)
loss of an eye, 66%% of wages during 150 weeks
(8)
complete loss of hearing in both ears, 66% % of wages during
180 weeks
(9)
complete loss of thumb, 66 2/3% of wages during 60 weeks
(10)
complete loss of index finger, 66%% of wages during 35 weeks
(11)
complete loss of second finger, 662/% of wages during 30
weeks
(12)
complete loss of third finger, 66%% of wages during 20 weeks
(13)
complete loss of fourth finger, 66%% of wages during 15
weeks
(17)
(18)

complete great toe, 662/3% of wages during 40 weeks
complete loss of any other toe, 66%% of wages during 16
weeks.
45. Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547, affd, 372
F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967). "The purpose of the act was to place the burden of
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terial, 46 the primary purpose is to benefit the employee, to compensate him for his injuries related to his employment by spreading the cost to the society he is benefiting. Undoubtedly, the legislature has also protected the employer by setting up specific rates
and maximum amounts that can be paid; but it can be fairly said
that the purpose of the acts is to enlarge the rights of the employee and protect the employee and his family from poverty resulting from a work related injury. Therefore, the objective of
protection would be furthered by the retention of any and all rights
of the injured employee not directly inconsistent with the basic
compensation scheme. The benefits provided by the existing
compensation acts are not expected to be full payment for all
losses suffered. No recovery is allowed for pain and suffering,
although medical and hospital expenses are generally covered.
Disfigurement and the physical injuries which do not affect earning capacity are generally not compensated. As Professor Larson
points out:
A compensation system, unlike tort recovery, does not pretend to restore to the claimant what he has lost; it gives
him a sum which, added to his remaining earning ability,
if any, will presumably
enable him to exist without being
47
a burden to others.
A study conducted by the Illinois Department of Labor indicates
that only twelve to fifteen per cent of actual wage loss is covered
by compensation payments, 4 and Sommers and Somers estimate
that on a nationwide basis workers recover only 1/3 of the total
economic loss to them resulting from work related accidents.4 9
Thus, to make such workmen's compensation benefits the sole
remedy of the worker when a negligent independent party is available to bear some of the burden is inconsistent with the basic purpose of the act.
The granting of immunity to the insurer under the workmen's
compensation for losses caused by industrial injuries and deaths upon the
several industries as part of the cost of production." Id. at 552; McCoy v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 87 So. 2d 809 (1956):
[Florida's workmen's compensation] law was designed to protect
workers and their dependents against hardships that arise from
workers' injury or death arising out of employment and occurring
during employment and to prevent those who depend on workers'
wages from becoming charges of the community.
Id. at 810.
46. See text accompanying notes 4-19 supra.
47.
48.

1 LARSON 10.

ILL. DEPT. Or LABOR, DIVIsIoN OF STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, AmNUAL REPORT ON COMPENSABLE WORK INJURIES 111 (1956).
49. SOMERS AND SOMMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 12,81 (1956).

compensation acts is not only contrary to the basic purpose of the
act but it is also inconsistent with a growing trend in the analogous field of charitable immunity. Those supporting charitable
immunity present the same arguments for its retention as do the
proponents of immunity for the workmen's compensation insurer.50
Yet, even though the clear trend is toward the abolishment of
charitable immunity,51 the legislatures are creating the same
kind of immunity in the workmen's compensation insurers.
Another anomalous result that could occur from the grant of
insurer immunity can best be illustrated by a hypothetical situation. Assume an automobile collision occurred between a vehicle
driven by an employee on the employer's business and a vehicle
operated by an insurance company employee also acting in the
course of his employment. 52 Under the workmen's compensation
acts granting absolute immunity to the workmen's compensation
insurer, the injured employee would not be able to sue the insurance company because the act grants the insurance company immunity from suit if the injury to employee occurs during his
course of employment. However, under the same circumstances
if the employee were on a "frolic," he would be able to sue the
50. The proponents of charitable immunity argue that these nonprofit
organizations are performing agent service to mankind and that abolishing
their tort immunity will cause these institutions to increase the cost of
their services, or in some cases cause them to discontinue their service,
and will clog and swamp the courts with suits against other charitable institutions. See, e.g., Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 208
A.2d 193, 209 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
51. The following cases have abolished charitable immunity in
their respective states: Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13
Alaska 546 (1952); Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220
(1951); Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1937); Dumey v. St.
Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Nicholson v. Good
Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940); Wheat v. Idaho Falls
Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d 1041 (1956); Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hospital Assn., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950); Noel
v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Mulikin
v. Jewish Hospital Assn. of La., 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961);
Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Mulliner
v. Evangelischer Diakoniessenverin, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920);
Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 56 So. 2d 709 (1951);
Welch v. Frislie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939); Collapy
v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Bing v.
Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 565, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Avellone v. St.
Johns Hospital, 165 Ohio 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956); Sisters of the Sorrowful
Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938); Hungerford v. Portland Sanitorium & Benevolent Assn., 235 Or. 412, 384 P.2d 1009 (1963);
Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 208 A.2d 193, 417 Pa. 486 (1965); Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 94 Utah 460, 78 P.2d 648
(1938); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d
230 (1950); Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 131
(1961); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
260 P.2d 765 (1953).
52. This situation was discussed by the court in Kotarski v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 244 F. Supp. 547, 558 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd, 372 F.2d 95
(6th Cir. 1967).
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insurer. Therefore, the absolute grant of immunity to workmen's
compensation carriers for injuries occurring in the course of employment isin conflict with the purpose of workmen's compensation acts, is contra to the trend toward abolishing charitable
immunity, and is so broad in its possible effects that it deprives
the injured employee of his right to full compensation if he is sufficiently unfortunate to be injured in the course of his employment.
VI.

THE EFFECT OF

No

IMMUNITY ON OUR COURTS

The effect on our court system of placing the workmen's compensation carrier in the category of possible third-party tortfeasors
has not been expressly considered by any of the courts in their
opinions, but it is fair to assume that both the courts and legislatures have considered this effect when deciding the issue of immunity. Conceivably it can be argued that almost any injury received by an employee in a plant is the result of a negligent safety
inspection. Similarly, almost any complications that develop after
an injury can be argued to have been caused by negligent treatment by a clinic employee. Thus, an injured employee who has
received or is receiving his workmen's compensation may claim
that his injury resulted from the negligence of the workmen's
insurance carrier and bring suit accordingly. Therefore, it seems
that the courts and legislatures must consider this "floodgates"
argument in deciding whether to grant the insurer immunity.
Allowing suit against workmen's compensation carriers will increase the workload on the courts, but as Dean Prosser points
out "this is a poor reason for denying recovery ... it is the business
of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of
a flood of litigation, and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence
on the part of any court or legislature to deny relief on such
grounds."3
The injured workman must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the workmen's compensation insurer had a duty to
him, that the insurer breached his duty by not acting reasonably
under the circumstances, and that this unreasonable action caused
his injury. Also the injured employee must be able to defend
against the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine as these defenses are interpreted by local law. All the courts which have
considered the question of the immunity of the workmen's corn53.

PROSSER 43.

pensation carrier and have discussed the question of duty agree
that the insurance company did owe the employee a duty even
though acting gratuitously. 54 The trend in these decisions, determining whether there is a duty and if that duty has been breached,
seems to be toward the view contained in section 323 of the Restatement of Torts, which reads:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration,
to render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or things,
is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if:
(1) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk
of such harm or
(2) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.55
This section recognizes that the insurer is rendering a gratuitous service to another and therefore the application of this
standard would require the injured workmen to prove by a preponderance of the evidence not only that insurer's actions were
negligent, but also that they increased the risk of harm to him or
that he was injured because of his reliance upon the insurer's action. Thus, the Restatement standard takes into account the fact
that the insurer's actions are actually protecting the worker and
in effect lowers his necessary standard of conduct accordingly.
The allowance of suit by injured employees against workmen's
compensation insurers may cause an additional number of cases to
be adjudicated, but this in itself is no reason to deny the remedy.
Further, if a legislature deems it necessary to place the insurer in
a special category because of policy consideration, it could do so by
adopting section 323 of the Restatement of Torts or a similar
standard and thus give effect to the beneficial aspects of the insurer's actions without completely denying the injured employee
a total recovery for his injuries in all cases.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A workmen's compensation insurer when it provides safety in-

spections and health clinics or other services not related to its role
of assuming employer's payments under the act is primarily acting
for its own benefit. Thus, it should be as amenable to suit as
54. Kotarski v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 372 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1967);

Bartolotta v. United States Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 276 F. Supp. 66, 74 (D.

Conn. 1967); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d
769 (1964); Smith v. American Emp. Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564
(1960); Ray v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 10 Mich. App. 55, 158 N.W.2d 786,
787 (1968); Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 434 Pa. 507, 517, 254 A.2d 27, 35
(1969) (dissenting opinion); Adcox v. Pennsylvania Mfg. Ass'n. Cas. Ins.
Co., 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 179, 1C6 (1965).
55.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TouTs § 323 (1965).
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any other entity for its alleged negligence unless there are overriding policy considerations inherent in the workmen's compensation system which make this liability inappropriate. Upon examination of relevant policy considerations it is found that the retention of the right to sue negligent third-parties is not inconsistent
with the policy of protection of the injured employee. Rather the
retention of the right to sue furthers the protection policy by allowing the injured employee an opportunity to be fully compensated
by a court of law. The arguments that the insurers will stop performing these services or raise their premium rates, or that there
will be more litigation in our courts are not sufficient policy reasons
for the grant of absolute immunity to the insurer. If a legislature
considers the workmen's compensation insurer's services so necessary for the protection of the employees that they deem it appropriate to place the insurer in a protected category, it is submitted
that other means besides absolute immunity would be a better
solution.
EDWARD A. FEDoK

